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the closer a cited decision is on all fours with the
facts in the case for which it is being cited the more
persuasive it is as precedent.

Nevertheless, the rule of

stare decisis, by its very nature, permits some differences
in facts between the two crises to occur and yet allows
the one case to be binding authority for the other. Moreover, contrary to respondent's assertions, the case of Percival is very much on all fours with this present action
and the principles enunciated in that case fully and completely cover the situation at hand here.

In Percival

the land described in the document of conveyance was measured in terms of so many feet by so many feet, exactly as
was true here.

In that case this Court held that the

description was unambiguous.

Also in Percival the buyer

by using simple mathematics would have known exactly what
he was getting, namely less than a half acre of land.

In

this case a simple measurement by the respondent, who after
all by his own testimony was a prominent builder and
developer, would have established exactly whether the
land described in both the earnest money offer and, more
importantly, in the subsequently executed real estate
contract was the same size as the land he thought he was
acquiring.
Respondent also claims that in Percival there
was a meeting of the minds, "unlike the case presently
before the Court."

That is an incorrect statement of the
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holding of Percival.

The Court in that case never had to

reach the question whether there was a meeting of the
minds since the document conveying the land was clear and
unambiguous.

On the other hand, Justice Crockett dissented

in that case specifically because, to him, the evidence
showed that the sellers either were mistaken as to what
property they intended to sell or they fraudulently misrepresented the size of the property to the buyers, in
which case there was never a meeting of the minds.

In the

present case, as it has been shown clearly by affidavit
and by testimony, the seller never intended to convey a
piece of property larger than approximately one-third (1/3)
acre and more specifically one hundred feet by one hundred
fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.).

Nor was there ever any

evidence that the seller attempted to defraud the purchaser into thinking that he, the buyer, was getting more
land than the seller had available.

As in Percival, there

is here no need to reach the question of a meeting of the
minds, because of the unambiguous document involved.
But if such is argued, it is answered by the fact that
both the seller and the buyer intended that the property
to be conveyed would be a parcel one hundred feet by one
hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.).
Respondent attempts to argue differences between
t le

*

Percival case and the instant case and yet is perfectly

willing to overlook the many differences between the Sine
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case and the present case and to claim that Sine and not
Percival is binding upon the Court on the facts of this
case.

An application of respondents own definition

of precedent defeats any use by him of Sine.

In that

case seller actually had additional land available for
sale, which is not true here.

Further there is evidence

in that case that the seller intended to convey the additional property sought by the buyer, which is clearly not
the case here.

Finally, and most importantly, in Sine

the description of the premises to be conveyed was fairly
ambiguous, referring as it did only to a street address
which was in the executed earnest money offer.

Even the

real estate contract perpetuated the use of the street
address.

In this case, the property was described in the

earnest money offer not in terms of an address, although
it was classified as the "abandoned LDS chapel," but more
specifically in terms of the acreage involved.

It should

also be borne in mind that the only document executed
by the parties in binding form was the contract of November 1, 1965, which specifically described the property
involved.

The earnest money agreement, described as exhibit

D-4, although signed by both parties, was specifically
made subject to the final approval of the Church's Law
Department in Salt Lake City, which approval was never
placed on the earnest money agreement.
* * *

* * *
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Since the facts in Sine are inapposite to the
facts in this case, the conclusion reached in that case
that reformation should be allowed is clearly not-applicable here.

Nevertheless, the general principles laid

down in Sine, just like the general principles laid down
* n Percival, both in the main opinion and in the dissent,
are applicable here.

If that were not true, the Court in

Percival would have had no other alternative than to overrule the holding of Sine.

That they did not do so nor

even need to do so comes because the basic principles
remain the same, namely, that only where there is mutual
mistake or mistake on part of one and fraud on the part of
another can a court intervene and apply parole evidence to
reform the contract in question.

The further rule as announ-

ced by Percival is that where the document on its face is
clear and unambiguous, parole evidence should not be allowed
to change the terms of the document.

This is for the good

and basic reason that if a document is clear and unambiguous,
its very simplicity argues against any claim of mutual
mistake or fraud.

This is the clear holding in Percival

since, as the dissent in that case points out, there appeared
to be some evidence of mutual mistake or fraud despite
the clear and unambiguous nature of the document sought
to be reformed.

In the case now before the Court, however,

there is, first of all, a clear and unambiguous document
and, secondly, no evidence or indication that there was either
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mutual mistake or fraud involved.
With the clear precedent of Percival the lower
court erred in not granting appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and erred further in not ruling in favor of appellant at the conclusion of the trial of the case.
POINT TWO
EVEN IF PAROLE EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED, THERE IS NO
BASIS FOR REFORMATION.
To establish the intent of the seller in selling
the property in question, testimony was obtained from the
person who, at the time of the transaction, was the only
member or officer of the appellant corporation.

He was

the corporation sole and as such was the only person to
speak for the corporation.

This power of the corporation

sole to act by himself and without authority from others
or without a board of directors is amply provided in Utah
Code Ann. §16-7-1, et. seq.
The testimony of the said corporation sole,
Albert Neff, was unequivocal that prior to offering the
land for sale he had looked up the deed to determine the
measurements of the property to be sold.

He calculated

that the Church had very close to a third (1/3) of an acre.
(Tr. 73)

He also was aware that a survey would be neces-

sary to establish exactly how the property fit on the
land.

At no time did he think that the property the

Church was selling was all that within the fences because
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he knew that "fences'* don11 indicate property at all here
in Manila,"

(Tr. 74)

His further testimony is he indi-

cated to Mr. Dan Brown, the realtor involved, that there
should be a survey because of such problems.

(Tr. 73)

Hence, the only person who was authorized to say what the
appellant corporation knew, thought, or intended testified
unequivocally that all of the land described in the contract
of sale executed by the parties was exactly the land which
the corporation intended to sell and no other.
There is argument by respondent that the realtor
conveyed a different impression to the seller than appellant intended, hence a mutual mistake was created.

Evi-

dence of the understanding of an agent is only useful
on this point, however, if that is a way to determine the
actual intent of the principal at the time in question.
Cf. Janke vs. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P.2d 933(1958).
On the other hand, in this case the true intentions of the
appellant were introduced into evidence.

Nor was there

any testimony which contradicted what Mr. Neff said with regard to what he understood as to the size and boundaries of
the property in question.

Equity in such a case asks not

whether an agent can bind a seller to complete a sale, but
rather what the true intention of the parties was at the time
of the execution of the document of transfer.

66 Am Jur 2d,

Reformation of Instruments §23. What the agent understood
in this case does not at all reflect what the appellant
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understood and intended.

Hence there was no mutual mistake.

Since there was no mutual mistake and since there
was no evidence submitted by the respondent making any
claim for fraud, to allow the parole evidence submitted
at trial to come in this case would not permit reformation
of the contract*

Respondent argues in his brief on this point:

"What is relevant is not what they [the corporation sole and
the realtor] knew, even assuming that that was the case,
but what they represented to the respondent."
Brief, Page 9.

Respondent's

That respondent is incorrect in his state-

ment is clear from the cases heretofore cited.
Even so, respondent received from the realtor
an earnest money offer which he signed, which described
the property as one-third (1/3) of an acre.

The respondent

also signed the real estate contract which specifically
described the property.

It should also be kept in mind,

contrary to the inferences found on Page 10 of Respondent's
Brief, that at no time did appellant own a parcel in
this area larger than one hundred feet by one hundred fifty
feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.).

It is true that between the

time respondent signed the earnest money offer and the time
the contract in question was executed appellant exchanged
property with a neighbor in order to correct a mistake in
property lines.

But that exchange of property gave appel-

lant no more property than it previously had.

Hence, if

what respondent is saying is that the property which should
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be conveyed to him is that which appellant held title to
at the time of respondent's signing the earnest money agreement, respondent still would be getting less property
than he seeks in the action at hand,
POINT THREE
RESPONDENT'S RELIEF, IF ANY, WOULD BE RESCISSION
AND NOT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Respondent's position has always been that it is
entitled to reformation of the document and enforcement of
the document in question as reformed.

It is clear however

that since appellant does not hold title to any other
property than is described in the contract in question,
respondent's recourse was for rescission and for damages.
Respondent however did not ever ask for rescission and has
had only one theory, namely, specific performance. Moreover, the lower court granted only ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) in
damages on which point respondent has not chosen to appeal.
Therefore, respondent is not entitled to require appellant
to grant by warranty deed property to which appellant does
not hold title.
POINT FOUR
RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
Respondent makes the claim on Page 11 of his Brief
that the reason he did not file suit sooner was because the
parties were attempting to get the matter resolved.

This

is also claimed as the reason why he was late in making
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his payments.

However, as Appellant's Brief amply points

out, and as the documents admitted to by respondent so
clearly show, any problems of which respondent had knowledge were not conveyed to any representatives for appellant until late in 1969. Nonetheless, the payments for
1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969 were all late and the payment
for 1970 was never made*

If the problems with the real

estate description was the cause of his late payments,
respondent never made those problems known to the appellant
until at least late in 1969.

Moreover, once the problems

were made known to appellant, and after some discussion of
resolution of the same which never came to fruition, respondent nonetheless let the matter lie until after appellant
had taken legal action against respondent.
Respondent argues that appellant's claim of
laches must fail for lack of showing of damage or prejudice to appellant by reason of respondent's delayed bringing
of the lawsuit.

Such damage or prejudice, however, is

easily established.

If the lower court's ruling were

sustained, appellant would have an action against the
realtor, Dan Brown, for negligence or improper representations in handling the sale of the property in question.
All of Mr. Brown's activities for appellant occurred in
May of 1965 or before, however, and it was not until
November or December of 1969, more than four (4) years
later, that respondent even made appellant aware of any
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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problems, although he knew of the same at least several
years earlier.

Hence any claims appellant would have

had against Brown are barred by the

Statute of Limitations.

/ Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25. All of the above is supported
by the evidence submitted in this case.

Clearly there has

been damage or prejudice to appellant because of respondent's inaction.
POINT FIVE
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A FORFEITURE OF THE
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF SALE.

Forfeiture i s the proper remedy in t h i s case
inasmuch as the appropriate notices were sent and ignored.
Respondent argues that i t was given no opportunity to cure
the delinquency.

Contrary to the statement in Respondent's

Brief on Page 20, the original notice sent to respondent
served on respondent on June 24, 1975, says t h a t i f delinquent payments, including delinquent taxes, p e n a l t i e s ,
a t t o r n e y ' s fees, and costs of the action, are not paid as
of June 30, 1975, by the hour of 5:00 p.m. "said contract
w i l l be forfeited by you [respondent] to the said Manila
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints effective as of said time and date."

The second notice

dated July 16, 19 75, and served on respondent July 17, 19 75,
indicates that because he did not correct the delinquency,
he had therefore forfeited h i s rights in the property and
was therefore a tenant a t w i l l .

The forms used (Exhibits
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A and B of Appellant's Request for Admission) are standard
in Utah and give the full notice required by the contract
pursuant to which they were sent and served.
With regard to the claim that respondent's loss would
be too great if the property inquestion were forfeited, that
is a matter which is to be weighed by this Court.

However,

it is submitted that because of the unusual delay by respondent
in paying for the property in question, because of the benefits
which respondent has derived from the property, including receiving the rent from the property on a daily and monthly basis,
(Tr. 39, 40) and weighing all of the other facts of the case,
it is not unconscionable for this Court to declare a forfeiture of the property and to> consider the amounts paid in as
liquidated damages.

Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485

P.2d 673 (1971) .
SUMMARY
Appellant has never had more than a one hundred
by one hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.) piece of
property available to sell in Manila, Utah.

Despite

respondent's claimed expectations, appellant knew that it
had no more property to sell than the one hundred by one
hundred fifty feet (100 ft. x 150 ft.) parcel.

It would be

manifestly unjust and improper for this Court to find that
respondent can now insist that appellant convey to him not
only the property described in the contract, which is
clear and unambiguous ,,.but also property to which it does
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not hold title.

Furthermore, appellant properly gave

notice to respondent of the extreme deficiencies in the payment of the amounts due under the contract, which notice
respondent chose to ignore even though respondent was
given an opportunity in which to cure the deficiency.
Appellant therefore should be entitled to enforce its
forfeiture of the property and have this Court reverse
the ruling of the lower court and quiet title to the parcel in the appellant.
DATED this

6?

day of March, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRT0N, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE
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